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In this paper we assume the use of the term bridge research as analogous to translational research, translational implying the transfer or translation 
of a basic principle to a different disciplinary field or a socially relevant situation that must be modified for the common good.
Abstract
This paper studies two analogous mechanisms: equity and reciprocity, from a bridge, or translational, research 
perspective. The characteristics of this perspective are described, as well as the overall strategies of laboratory 
and field research for studying these mechanisms and their links to the process of conditional cooperation 
and coercive reciprocity in representative situations of everyday life. The data gathered are discussed from this 
perspective on the basis of the selfish rationality model. 
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Resumen
Se aborda el estudio de dos mecanismos análogos: equidad y reciprocidad desde una perspectiva de investi-
gación puente. Se describen las características de esta perspectiva, las estrategias generales de investigación 
de laboratorio y de campo para el estudio de dichos mecanismos y sus conexiones con el proceso de la 
cooperación condicional y la reciprocidad coercitiva en situaciones representativas de la vida cotidiana. Se 
discuten datos obtenidos desde dicha perspectiva con base en el modelo de la racionalidad egoísta.
Descriptores: Investigación puente, equidad, reciprocidad, comportamiento social, desarrollo.
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This paper looks at two analogous and complemen-
tary mechanisms as part of the study of the organi-
zation of social behavior: equity and reciprocity. In 
general, the quantitative study of equitable exchanges 
has been conducted under experimental conditions, 
while research on reciprocity has been undertaken 
both experimentally and through field work (Ander-
son, 1976; Cairns, 1979; Colman, 2003; Santoyo, 
1994). The way the research on both mechanisms is 
connected and complemented can be strategically 
situated in what has come to be known as bridge 
research (Fisher & Mazur, 1998) or translational re-
search (Gunner & Cicchetti, 2009).
One of the purposes of social behavior organiza-
tion studies is to assess and extend the principles de-
rived from basic research (BaR), to everyday settings. 
This extension is crucial for increasing the external 
validity of these principles and to optimize those 
points in which Behavioral sciences (BS) converge 
(Gintis, 2007). In this paper we present empirical ex-
amples of basic research on the equity mechanism 
and how it is feasible to extend its findings through 
bridge research (BrR) or “translational1” research. 
One premise of the BS has been the “canonical 
selfishness model” that underlies organisms’ deci-
sions; a number of studies, however, have found 
consistent deviations that demonstrate, on the ba-
sis of different experimental games, that participants 
choose pro-social courses of action more frequently 
than predicted, and even sacrificed personal profit 
in order the modify the distribution of payoffs within 
the group (Henrich et al., 2005). This basic premise, 
a keystone of the BS, regulates how social exchange 
researchers over the last few decades have been 
looking at the way organisms interact to produce ef-
ficient or inefficient results, both for the individual 
and for the social unit under consideration.
BrR tries to extend the findings of BaR to applied 
settings (Fisher & Mazur, 1997). The contemporary 
perspective called translational research aims at de-
ploying basic knowledge in the search for social 
welfare (Gunner & Cicchetti, 2009), contributing 
new assessment strategies, and designs for interven-
tion or prevention programs.
1. In this paper we assume the use of the term bridge research as analogous to translational research, translational implying the 
transfer or translation of a basic principle to a different disciplinary field or a socially relevant situation that must be modified 
for the common good.
BrR that replicates the findings of BaR can un-
cover new and potentially useful applications of the 
basic principles, but even research that does not rep-
licate them can help to generate new BaR questions, 
which contribute to the understanding of the limita-
tions of certain explanations, and the analysis of the 
contexts in which these explanations are applicable 
and those in which they might not be (McGuire, 
1997).
Below, a description is given of two lines of re-
search into functionally equivalent mechanisms: equi-
ty and reciprocity. These lines of research make use of 
experimental settings complemented by field work. 
For this, the study of these mechanisms is based on 
analogous quantitative models. Thus, the objective of 
the paper is to present a BrR-based strategy to account 
for the generality of the equity process and its quanti-
tatively analogous mechanisms: conditional coopera-
tion and reciprocity under different study conditions: 
ranging from laboratory with n = 2 and laboratory 
with n > 2, to situations in which the research condi-
tions call for non-intrusive observational methods that 
are characteristic of field work. 
Justification of the Bridge research strategy.
The problem of explaining social mechanisms by 
appealing to behavior principles and their operation 
in particular circumstances is central to various so-
cial sciences (Elster, 1989; Henrich et al., 2005; Ho-
mans, 1974). 
The study of coetaneous links that the overall de-
velopment of the BS has promoted in recent decades, 
in fields such as Sociology and Behavioral Psychol-
ogy (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985), Microeconomics 
(Ainslie, 1992; Rachlin, Battalio, Kagel, & Green, 
1981), Experimental Economics and Game Theory 
(Camerer, 2003), Political Science (Elster, 1989), So-
ciobiology and Development Science (Cairns, Elder, 
& Costello, 1996; Gunner & Cicchetti, 2009), has 
permitted the evolution of the BS and related BrR as 
a key tool. In other words, there is no reason to limit 
the links resulting from the perspective of this paper 
exclusively to extending laboratory principles to ev-
eryday life; it is also feasible to find interdisciplinary 
links, as evidenced by the progress made in the BS. 
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This paper, for the sake of parsimony and cov-
erage, focuses on the mechanisms of equity and 
reciprocity. The advantage to selecting these mecha-
nisms is that they are recognized as basic, universal 
and related to other social processes (Adams, 1965; 
Mellers, 1982; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985), and they 
constitute the basis of higher-order strategic process-
es for studying social exchange (Caporael, Dawes, 
Orwell, & van de Kragt, 1989; Henrich, et al., 2005). 
Thus, the decision to study these mechanisms allows 
them to be indentified in social exchanges of differ-
ent kinds and ubiquity in different settings. As will 
be shown in this paper, the proposed models incor-
porate, as an explicit object of study, components of 
the contribution that different people make to the re-
lationship, as well as of the consequences or results 
derived from it. This constitutes the comparative and 
complementary basis of the proposed models, as 
will be demonstrated in the following sections.
Basic Research of n = 2 Social Exchanges: The Case 
of Equity
The study of social exchanges implies the analysis 
of the contribution that each person makes in a re-
lationship and the “rewards” that she obtains for it 
(Adams, 1976; Berkowitz & Walster, 1976). In Equity 
Theory, the relationships that are studied have been 
expressed as linear equations (Anderson, 1976), 
where the proportion of a person’s payoffs or re-
wards in relation to the other’s is equal to the corre-
sponding proportion of her effort, merits or relative 
contributions, as expressed in equation 1. 
Oi / Oi + Oj   =  Ii / Ii + Ij         (Eq. 1)
Oi and Oj are the results or payoffs of persons i and 
j; Ii and Ij are the corresponding values of their con-
tributions to the relationship.
In general, this strategy, for both dyadic studies 
and those that work with n > 2, starts with BaR for 
the emission of judgments using instruments derived 
from functional psychophysics (Anderson, 1996), 
as an exploratory basis for future real-time social-
exchange experiments. For the equity-judgment 
emission study, the participants respond to different 
situations requiring a decision. For example, Santoyo 
and Bouzas (1992) demonstrated how the model (Eq. 
1) adequately describes equity judgments in mul-
tiple situations, in which variables such as levels of 
merit among participants, resources to be allocated 
or situational contexts are programmed factorially. 
The participants decided the amount of money to 
distribute between pairs of hypothetical professors 
according to their level of merit and preparation, in 
contexts of differential resources or different levels 
of inflation, among others. In short, the participants 
allocated the resources as a relative function of the 
merits of the others involved in the comparison situa-
tion, which is consistent with Information Integration 
Theory (IIT) applied to equity (Anderson, 1996). 
For the study of equitable exchanges, experimen-
tal settings were developed to identify the relative 
contributions and payoffs that two people emit and 
obtain respectively in a real-time relationship (Hake 
& Vukelich, 1972). The procedures imply repetitive 
exchange situations with another person present 
during the session whose behavior produces interde-
pendent tangible consequences; this strategy allows 
for the identification and assessment of mechanisms 
for the microregulation of the exchanges. 
As an example of BaR with the goal of identifying 
social exchange strategies under conditions of play 
on a computer, pairs of 8- and 10-year-old school-
children decided the effort allocation for their part-
ner (pressing a button associated with a requirement 
of a variable-ratio reinforcement program (VR): 20, 
40 or 80). In addition, under conditions of effort and 
payoffs allocation, they chose points for their partner 
(e.g., as part of the task they allocated one of four 
payoff magnitudes: 1, 2, 4 or 8 points per turn); the 
points were exchanged at the end of each session for 
candy, toys or video-game access time.
According to this class of strategies, patterns of 
cooperative behavior organization can be studied, 
as well as “sub-optimal” relationship patterns (e.g., 
alternating reciprocal allocation of RV80 with one 
payoff point), which is equivalent to a “social trap” 
analogy; these were very frequent in the sessions. 
Although it was not surprising to find patterns in 
which reciprocal allocations represented “optimal” 
benefits, such as the allocation of the task that im-
plied the least effort and the greatest payoffs possible 
(e.g., VR 20 and 8 points), both data are consistent 
with the canonical selfishness model. The former 
produced inefficient results, while the reciprocal al-
locations produced beneficial results for both par-
ticipants. The difference lies in the perspective of the 
focal subject: personal vs. collective.
Equity and reciprocity
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The study implies a sequential combination of 
probable results, given the options chosen alter-
nately by each member of the pair, which can be 
expressed in a payment matrix similar to those used 
in the game theory field (Colman, 1982) (see Table 
1, to represent the social exchange in question). The 
different game allocation options that participant i 
makes are represented in the rows, while the alloca-
tion made by j is represented in the columns. Each 
cell represents the joint allocated effort ratio in an al-
ternate turn. The values 2 and 4 imply that the effort 
allocated by j is double or quadruple that allocated 
by i, respectively. An equivalent representation can 
also be made for the points that the participants al-
locate to themselves in the exchange, with values of 
1, 2, 4 or 8 points. 
In general, the results obtained have been de-
scribed by the equity formulation (Eq. 1), describing 
the executions of both of the children with optimal 
strategies and those with “non-optimal” strategies 
and replicated under conditions of low, medium and 
high-resource contexts for the focal-elector child 
(VR 80, VR 40, VR 20, respectively). In general, the 
phases of the experiment implied that the children in 
the role of elector, when it was their turn to decide 
the game that their partner would play, had games 
associated with these contexts predetermined for 
them by the experimenter during the session. Thus, 
each child could, in her turn as partner, win points 
depending on the game that the focal child allocated 
her; although when it was her turn to be the elector, 
she simultaneously received points according to the 
predetermined context, through which all the chil-
dren passed. 
The data from Table 2 show that in the differ-
ent contexts in which the equity formulation was 
assessed, the R2 values were higher than .9, which 
is evidence that equation 1 describes the equity re-
lationships between peers, regardless of the context 
of abundant resources (VR20) or scarce resources 
(VR80), and even independently of their interaction 
strategy (e.g., cooperative or competitive).
To detect the exchange strategies it was neces-
sary to adapt sequential analysis techniques, which 
uncovered the existence of a growing correspon-
dence and correlation of the allocation of effort and 
points to the partner as a function of their experi-
ence in the game. This correspondence usually cen-
ters on the reciprocal and successive allocation of 
the game associated with the highest reinforcement 
rate (VR20), which suggests a strategy of optimal al-
location between peers (Santoyo, 2002; Santoyo & 
Colmenares, 2003a). 
In another study (in progress), Santoyo and Col-
menares replicated and extended these findings, es-
pecially when the participants (university students, 
participating for academic credit) had information 
about their partners’ choices and payoffs (r2 = .77), as 
opposed to situations in which they were not given 
this information (r2 = .4). Thus, the information about 
what the partner does and obtains is critical, which 
might imply that, in order for equity to occur, so-
cial comparison is important. In general, it has been 
demonstrated that the participants compare their ef-
Effort allocated by j
    VR 20   VR 40    VR 80
VR 20 1 2 4
VR 40 1 2
VR 80 1
Effort          
allocated       
by i
Table 1
Effort allocation matrix. Ratio of effort allocated to partner by 
children i, j in their successive role as focal-elector child or 
partner-receiver, depending on the turn. The ratios are derived 
from the combination of the requirements of the variable-ra-
tio program (VR) that they alternately allocate to their partner 
(Adapted from Santoyo, 1992). The ones in the diagonal repre-
sent maximum reciprocity in the different conditions.
Table 2
Condition R2   Det. Coef. Std. E. D.F. F
VR 20 .993 1.01 .03 1, 19 1373 ***
VR 40 .994 .96 .02 1,13 2266 ***
VR 80 .992 .97 .02 1,18 2413 ***
  *** p =.000.
Linear regression analysis, for each experimental condition. 
R2 data, Determination coefficient, Standard error, degrees of 
freedom and F value. The analysis is derived from the equity 
model (see equation 1) for all the dyads under each experimen-
tal condition or context (adapted from Santoyo, 1992).
Santoyo
11Journal of Behavior, Health & Social Issues, vol. 1 num. 2 11-2009
fort and results between themselves, which has been 
assumed to be signaling factors taken into consider-
ation for action in the exchange (González, 2009).
This is an example of BaR on social exchanges 
between dyads. The next section presents some re-
lated findings when the experimental unit is n > 2, 
which makes it possible to extend the n = 2 labora-
tory findings to situations where that level of analysis 
is extended to one of n > 2, especially in those in 
which the contents of social exchange are situated in 
more realistic conditions of everyday life.
The experimental n > 2 study: social dilemmas
The study of social dilemmas implies the analysis 
of strategies in contexts of scarce and highly valued 
resources in collective situations. In general, the so-
cial dilemmas represent a “deficient equilibrium”; 
equilibrium in that nobody has, for the time being, 
an incentive to change their consumer behavior; de-
ficient in the sense that there is at least one alterna-
tive result that would be in the participants’ interest 
to obtain and that would leave many better off (Kol-
lock, 1998).
A public goods dilemma (PGD) involves more 
than two people, where each one faces the prob-
lem of whether or not to contribute to the common 
good. The contribution implies an immediate cost 
for the contributor, but it generates a shared ben-
efit for all. Each person has the incentive to avoid 
the cost and enjoy the benefit (e.g., evading taxes), 
but when many do this, resources are exhausted or 
services deteriorate in the medium and long term, 
leading to an atrocious result: hence the term “social 
trap” (Platt, 1973). Thus, a public good (PG) is a re-
source that benefits everyone, regardless of whether 
they contributed to its availability or not. 
A resource dilemma (RD), on the other hand, is 
defined by the non-exclusivity of consumption (any-
one can make use if it) and is characterized by the 
“withdrawal” of benefits from the common good (the 
water we waste cannot be used by anyone). There-
fore, the maintenance of the PG will depend on the 
amount of available resources, on the resource’s 
exhaustion or consumption rate, on the relationship 
between availability and the number of users of the 
resource, as well as on the resource’s renewal rate. 
To summarize, social traps are characterized by 
a structure that implies that people respond with ex-
cessive consumption or refusal to cooperate, looking 
for payoffs or the evasion of immediate costs; in the 
long term, these traps result in individual and com-
munal losses, with the corresponding devaluation 
of the resources. Thus, it is feasible that individuals 
identify information in their surroundings before de-
ciding whether to cooperate or not. The mechanism 
of conditional cooperation, like equity, incorporates 
comparison between relative contributions and pay-
offs among players. In this case, the extension lies in 
offering a task that is more realistic and with n > 2 
than the one assumed in the equity study. 
In this section, we present some data about PGD 
and RD. At a first IIT-based level (Anderson, 1996), 
we present data from two recent studies about what 
participants are willing to contribute to a common 
fund in a housing complex that would cover unex-
pected emergency maintenance expenses. The situ-
ation represents a dilemma, in the sense that there is 
the option of making a minimum contribution (e.g., 
$30 instead of $300), with the expectation that oth-
ers will make the generous contribution; the social 
trap occurs when the majority assumes this position, 
resulting in an insufficient overall contribution, and 
few or no services. 
A series of studies on PGD in residential complex 
settings (Santoyo & Colmenares, 2003b; Santoyo & 
López, 2003), assessed the information that partici-
pants consider before making their contributions to 
the common good. This information is based on fac-
tors such as: the percentage of residents willing to 
contribute to the PG (e.g., 10, 30, 50, 70 or 90%), 
the average amount that they contribute (e.g., $30, 
150 or 330), or the moment when the contribution 
must be made (e.g., today, in 6 or 12 months). The 
situation involves a factorial design where each per-
son faces each combination of values. According to 
IIT, it is feasible to make the graphic representation 
of the integration rules used; these rules can be ex-
pressed algebraically. 
Figure 1a presents data on the amount that the 
participants are willing to contribute to a community 
fund of a residential complex, as a function of the 
percentage of residents who are expected to make a 
contribution and the amount of money they would 
contribute (the instructions pointed out that the in-
formation had been obtained by surveying the con-
dominium owners). 
In general, the participants were willing to con-
tribute a greater amount of money as the overall 
amount of residential contributions increased and 
Equity and reciprocity
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the percentage of residents willing to contribute grew 
(see Figure 1a). While the percentage of residents 
willing to contribute has no effect when the resi-
dential contribution is mid-level ($150), systematic 
effects take place when the residential contribution 
is low or high ($30 or $330), with the contribution 
decreasing or increasing, respectively, as a function 
of the percentage of residents who contribute, an 
effect that involves an algebraic multiplication rule 
(Anderson, 1996). 
Subsequently, more refined analyses showed 
that the participants tend to contribute slightly lower 
amounts than those contributed by others (except 
in the case of minimum contributions, $30). When 
everyone behaves this way, the overall amount ob-
tained is less than ideal, with the self-evident con-
sequence of a decreased chance of obtaining the 
minimum amount of resources needed to meet the 
communal needs. These data are evidence of a phe-
nomenon that we can describe as conditional co-
operation (González & Santoyo, 2007), which rep-
resents an extension of the operation of the dyadic 
equity mechanism as a function that is proportional 
to the contribution that the other members of the 
group are seen to be giving as a unit.
Contributions made in PGD’s take place in a time 
perspective of due dates, where decisions are situ-
ated in a context of when the “cost” of contribution 
will have to be assumed. Will more resources be col-
lected if the contribution must be made today than 
if it is due in six months or a year? Even though the 
specific amounts of money might be “objectively” 
similar, does the fact of imposing a due date affect 
the contribution to the common good? 
In general, given the assumption that preferences 
are consistent over time (Coombs, Dawes & Tver-
sky, 1981; Dawes, 1988), it would be expected that 
each individual would be consistent in choosing the 
preferred amount of money to contribute, regard-
less of when it was due (Frederick, Lowenstein & 
O’Donoghue, 2003). Nevertheless, the literature in 
the field of intertemporal choice (e.g., Ainslie, 1992; 
Rachlin, 1994), shows that people are inconsistent 
in different contexts, which represents an anomaly 
Figure 1. Integration of Information in Public Goods Dilemma. Monetary contribution rate to public good as function of the percent-
age of residents willing to contribute and of their average contribution (graph 1a, modified by Santoyo & López, 2003). Monetary 
contribution to the public good as a function of residents’ average contribution and the due date for making the contribution (Graph 
1b, modified by Santoyo & Colmenares, 2003b).
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Figure 2. Consumption in a resource dilemma as a function of the group partners and the grouping of turns. Total points ob-
tained in simple turns, or blocks of two and four turns. The dark bars represent the participants with virtual partners that simulated 
moderate consumption, and the white bars represent participants with virtual partners who simulated excessive, non-cooperative 
consumption (modified from González & Santoyo, 2002)..
of the self-interest model. The work of Santoyo and 
Colmenares (2003b) is situated in this perspective, 
extending the findings of the field of intertemporal 
choice to a perspective of analysis of the process of 
“temporal discount” implied in a PGD. 
The way people integrate temporal information 
for an eventual contribution is presented in Figure 
1b. In general, the tendency is to “offer” a greater 
amount of money the farther away in time the due 
date is. The contributions, furthermore, tend to in-
crease as a function of the residents’ overall contri-
butions. The implied algebraic rule corresponds, in 
this case, to an additive-type rule with parallel lines 
between the due dates. These findings are added 
to the list of anomalies in the field of intertempo-
ral choice. But the study of temporally distributed 
contributions extends the mechanisms discovered 
under n = 2 laboratory conditions to settings that are 
ecologically and conceptually more relevant. Thus, 
the conditional contribution as a wider reciprocity 
phenomenon must be considered in a context of the 
factors involved in the decision-making situation, a 
result that is consistent with the BrR proposal.
For the study of resource dilemmas, González 
and Santoyo (2002) developed an experimental set-
ting to analyze social exchanges, with simulations 
of virtual high-consumption (or “competitive”) and 
moderate consumption (or “cooperative”) partners. 
One study evaluated the hypothesis that self-control 
in the individual situation and cooperation in a sit-
uation of dyadic play are greater when choice at-
tempts are grouped than when they are made one 
at a time (Brown & Rachlin, 1999). For this reason, 
we decided to evaluate and extend this hypothesis 
to n > 2 situations. The participants were exposed to 
situations where they decided the amount of con-
sumption in each attempt, or the amount that they 
would take from an urn every two or four turns, de-
pending on the situation. In general, the participants 
were sensitive to their partners’ simulated consump-
tion. The exposure to blocks of attempts had an ef-
fect related to the peers’ consumption, which grew 
as more attempts were integrated into the decision 
block (Figure 2).
Equity and reciprocity
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Those who thought they were interacting with 
partners who exhibited moderate patterns of con-
sumption obtained more points at the end of the ses-
sion and as a function of the grouping of turns. Those 
who thought they were interacting with greedy, high-
consumption partners, obtained a lower amount of 
payoffs, which produced deterioration in the func-
tion of resource renewal, leading obviously to its 
exhaustion. It was observed that participants with 
“non-cooperative” partners did not benefit from the 
demand to integrate group decisions into blocks, 
meaning that the grouping process proposed with 
n = 2 by Brown and Rachlin (1999) is not confirmed 
when the participants are exposed to these condi-
tions, an effect that calls for further analysis in future 
studies. To sum up, the participants’ sensitivity to the 
simulated consumption of virtual partners represents 
a perspective that is different from the mechanism of 
“conditional cooperation” as a function of reciproc-
ity perceived in the decision situation. 
A more recent study by González and Santoyo 
(2007) extended these findings to a situation in 
which group size was manipulated in a PGD in a 
simulation of high contribution by virtual partners 
while the point of supply was kept steady. González 
(2009) also extended the conditional cooperation 
hypothesis to a variety of experimental and signal-
ing conditions (e.g., PGD, RD, and a condition of 
successive exposure to both), showing a variety of 
possibilities to be incorporated into the literature on 
equity mechanisms.
Up to this point, some of the strategies used in 
BaR have been described. In general, this research 
is complemented with field work in the follow-
ing section. The in situ study of social interactions 
makes it possible to analyze the configuration of 
behavior patterns, their stability and change, and 
the individual differences in natural, relatively con-
trolled situations such as a school setting. The fol-
lowing setting describes the approach centered on 
the analysis of everyday interactions observed in situ 
which has been called the “Coyoacán Longitudinal 
Study” (CLS), for which the reciprocity mechanism 
is assumed, employed more often in this setting, but 
whose structure is similar to the structure presented 
for the equity model, comparing relative contribu-
tions and results that the participants make in the 
relationship. 
Field work: bridge for extending basic mechanisms
In this paper, data on the reciprocity mechanism are 
selected, by way of example, from the Coyoacán 
Longitudinal Study (CLS) (Santoyo, 2007; Santoyo 
& Espinosa, 2006) to explain the social adjustment 
of elementary-school children in different situations 
over time. Like the equity model, the reciprocity 
model incorporates information from the contribu-
tions that different social agents make to the rela-
tionship, as well as their possible results; the differ-
ence lies in that fact that the data are obtained with 
observational sampling in field work, with no out-
right manipulation of the events and consequences 
to which the participants are exposed. In this sense, 
this research strategy coherently complements, as 
required by bridge research, the findings derived 
from laboratory situations and makes it possible to 
extend the generality of these situations.
The in situ study of social behavior organization 
is fundamental for explaining the operation of regu-
lation mechanisms and for analyzing their potential 
consequences. It is important to understand the 
proximal factors in the regulation of social interac-
tions because their study makes it possible to explain 
the configuration and trajectory of behavior patterns 
(Cairns, 1979; Cairns et al., 1996).
In general, the children spend many hours of 
their life in the school setting, making this an ideal, 
relatively ordered and permanent setting for analyz-
ing how interpersonal relationships and the relative 
effects of the regulatory and institutional aspects are 
structured, as a part of the context and social ecol-
ogy in which they are immersed. In addition, social 
adjustment in school is closely related to current ac-
ademic performance and potential social adaptation 
to other settings.
The core methodological strategy of the CLS is 
based on the design and use of the Behavior Obser-
vation System for Social Interactions (BOS-SI) (San-
toyo, Espinosa, & Bachá, 1994), which allows for the 
identification of the direction, quality, content, con-
text beginning, configuration and participating social 
agents in each episode of the codified behavioral 
flow (for the validity, reliability and optimization of 
BOS-SI, see Espinosa, Blanco, & Santoyo, 2006).
The sequential analysis of the behavioral flow 
makes it possible to discover organized patterns of 
behavior that are susceptible to rigorous evaluation; 
their formal identification requires a contingency 
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analysis using conditional probabilities whose ad-
justed remainders exceed the level of statistical sig-
nificance, > 1.96, for excitatory sequences, which 
implies a demonstration of the non-randomness of 
the patterns (Haberman, 1978; Siegel & Castellan, 
1970). Some of the applications have been conduct-
ed with infants and nursery-school children (Espino-
sa, Anguera & Santoyo, 2004) and pre-school and 
elementary-school children (Santoyo, 2007; Santoyo 
& Espinosa, 2006).
The generic strategy for analyzing behavioral 
flow lies in: procedures for sampling focal children 
(90 or 50 minutes of observation per child in daily 
sessions of 15 and 10 minutes, in the classroom and 
at recess, respectively); analyzing the direction of 
the interaction (to identify who initiates the episode); 
identifying the quality of the act (coercive or pro-so-
cial); analyzing the relative duration of the episodes, 
etc. From this information, data are collected on the 
frequency of the episodes and whether they were 
answered by other children, which yields informa-
tion that is analogous to the information generated 
with the equity model, except that in these cases, 
the data are collected with no outright manipulation 
by the researchers. Equation 2 expresses the positive 
reciprocity model (Santoyo, 1996). 
Ep /Ep + Rp = Spep / Spep + Sprp   (Eq. 2)
Where Ep and Rp represent positive emission or 
reception events (e.g., Ep: the focal child addresses 
another child; Rp: a classmate addresses the focal 
child). Spep and Sprp represent the consequence of 
these events (e.g., Ep or Rp are positively answered 
by the classmate or focal child, respectively). Thus, 
these events correspond to the social process of 
choosing available partners in the setting and its 
consequences. The analysis may also be done for 
the study of coercion (Patterson, 1982), and for epi-
sodes of aggression among school children, which is 
represented in Equation 3.
En /En + Rn = Snen / Snen + Snrn     (3)
Where En and Rn represent negative emission 
and reception or provocations initiated by the focal 
child or by her classmates, respectively. Snen and 
Snrn represent whether the provocations were an-
swered by the classmate or focal child, respectively. 
In this way, it is feasible to study the organization 
of coercive behavior among peers by analyzing the 
reciprocity of coercive actions by children identi-
fied as aggressive (risk) with respect to those that are 
not identified as such (control). Coercive reciproc-
ity is a differential characteristic between risk and 
control children; the former display reciprocity and 
symmetry in coercive acts, which serves to explain 
the phenomenon of escalation within and between 
episodes (Cairns, Santoyo, & Holly, 1994); the latter 
do not display negative reciprocity, do not escalate 
the episode; on the contrary, they tend to answer 
in a way that is incompatible with the provocations 
(Cairns et al., 1994; Santoyo, Colmenares, Figueroa, 
Cruz, & López, 2008). It is important to reiterate that 
the structure of the reciprocity model is similar to 
that of the equity model, both algebraically and in 
the contrasting components. Thus, in the negative 
reciprocity model, for example, the focal child’s 
relative provocations of his peers are compared to 
the relative consequences received by both parts; 
the equity model likewise compares contributions 
and results of dyadic and group units, as the case 
may be. In addition, these data are consistent with 
the premises of the human nature model for under-
standing violent behavior, which was derived from 
the matching law but extended to account for crime 
(Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985), which is consistent 
with the premises of BrR. Even though this paper 
has not explicitly assumed the matching law as a 
mechanism to exemplify, we can point out that in 
the CLS, the children that display the most coercive 
behavior receive more attention from the teacher 
and from classmates on account of this behavior 
than for academic or pro-social behavior, which 
extends the conclusions of Wilson and Herrnstein’s 
model (1985) to the school settings.
The study of reciprocity in situ also makes it pos-
sible to broaden the perspective of development by 
considering children’s social network. In this way, 
while some children identified as aggressive are cen-
tral to the network, others are rejected (González, 
1998). Nevertheless, their relationship with other 
aggressive children constitutes a risk factor, given 
the high probability of negative reciprocity that they 
maintain and that allows these interactions to con-
solidate. Thus, field study of reciprocity, both coer-
cive and positive, has proven to be a useful tool for 
our BrR goals.
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Recent studies (López, 2005; López & Santoyo, 
2005) have found that negative and positive reci-
procity patterns describe the behavior organization 
of spouses with a history of violence, as opposed 
to “non-violent” spouses, who display more positive 
reciprocity than the former. Similar findings have 
been found in conflictive pairs of teenagers and their 
parents, unlike those displayed by non-conflictive 
pairs of teenagers and their parents (Pérez, 2009), 
in abused children, aggressive children, and a com-
parison group of non-aggressive children (Santoyo 
et al., 2008) and in research in progress using data 
from the CLS files, in cases of bullying (Santoyo & 
Mendoza, in progress). These data represent the rel-
evance of the reciprocity mechanism given the lack 
of quantitative data on the asymmetry of this class of 
relationships (Olweus, 2003).
The study of social relationships is another of the 
possibilities for linkage with reciprocity, permitting 
the identification of aspects of the behavior flow 
that constitutes control mechanisms. In this way, it 
has been possible to assess the function of effec-
tiveness, correspondence and social reciprocity as 
functional indices that account for the positioning 
of children with special educational needs within 
the social network (Rubio, 2004; Rubio & Santoyo, 
2004) and for the stability of the social relationships 
of schoolchildren of different ages and social skills 
(Espinosa, in progress; Flores & Santoyo, 2009). In 
general, reduced positive reciprocity results in hav-
ing few friends or not being accepted in the group, 
which leads to adverse consequences such as: Low 
achievement level, learning difficulties, dropping 
out of school, delinquent behavior, among others 
(Cairns & Cairns, 1994; Putallaz & Gottman, 1981). 
Furthermore, the lack of social skills could be a fac-
tor that predisposes a person to the development of 
psychopathology (Arkowitz, 1981).
Discussion
This paper has presented findings derived from the 
study of the analogous mechanisms of equity, condi-
tional cooperation and reciprocity, from a perspec-
tive that allows for the systematic extension of the 
findings derived from basic n = 2 research with ex-
perimental tasks involving the allocation of effort and 
payoffs to the partner, to laboratory n > 2 studies in 
which social dilemmas are simulated with decision-
making tasks in hypothetical situations of everyday 
life or social exchange with tangible, real-time con-
sequences depending on the consumption of re-
sources or the contribution to public goods, where 
conditional cooperation is the key mechanism. In 
both cases, the process involves comparing relative 
contributions and payoffs among participants as the 
key mechanism that explains these social exchanges. 
Thus, the extension of restricted n = 2 situations to 
analogous n > 2 situations from everyday life rep-
resents a first step in the bridge research strategy, 
where the aim is to extend the implications of equity 
mechanisms.
For the experimental study of social exchanges, 
the assumption of selfish rationality has regulated a 
large part of the international research in different ar-
eas, although it has not been immune to controversy 
(Gintis, 2007; Henrich et al., 2005). The laboratory 
research data presented here, both n = 2 and n > 
2, are consistent with this assumption. Nonetheless, 
these data suggest that social exchanges are regu-
lated by environmental factors such as the coopera-
tion of others. In other words, cooperation is not a 
question of “all or nothing”; the data presented in-
dicate that participants decide on their contribution 
as a function of how much others contribute, of the 
level of effort or payoffs the partners allocate to us, 
or their level of consumption, as related to associ-
ated temporal factors (i.e., contribution restrictions). 
These factors have been called signaling factors as 
information that can be obtained from the social 
environment and whose key reference is the condi-
tional cooperation mechanism (González, 2009). 
One challenge for the bridge research perspec-
tive is the development of experimental settings for 
simulating social traps in an ecologically valid way. 
In a scenario where research has been developed 
with arbitrary tasks, unrealistic incentives and unrep-
resentative subjects, it is up to us to design more cre-
ative experiments that account for the mechanisms 
that configure the structure of different social traps. 
The development of bridge research represents a 
step in the right direction toward a greater generality 
of the principles that underlie the explanatory frame-
work of social exchanges.
A different level of extension is represented by 
field studies in which the reciprocity mechanism, 
analogous to the equity mechanism, is put to the test 
within naturalist research based on observational 
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methodology. In general, the reciprocity model has 
been particularly useful for detecting risk or protec-
tion factors when studies are done of coercive be-
havior patterns, social preferences and social com-
petence. The structure of this mechanism is similar 
to that of the equity model, with the substantive 
difference that the reciprocity mechanism has been 
used more in field studies, especially those in which 
social interaction is the object of study.
Finally, more communication opportunities must 
be sought among researchers from different disci-
plines who are interested in similar phenomena (e.g., 
social traps, cooperation, selfishness, coercion, ne-
gotiation, etc.); who seek to extend basic principles 
to everyday life situations for the purpose of diag-
nosis, assessment, prevention or intervention; who 
develop experimental settings simulating socially 
relevant phenomena; who offer basic research-
ers evidence of the validity of certain principles or 
mechanisms; who are committed to the formation 
of professionals and who see bridge research as a 
strategic curricular axis. 
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